Time for a threesome: European leadership and America by Larres, Klaus
T
he new closeness goes back to october
2001 when the three leaders attempted to coordinate their
response to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon. Most other European Union (EU) member
states were not amused. They gatecrashed a Downing Street
dinner the following month which British Prime Minister Tony
Blair intended for his two leadership partners. Italy, Spain,
Belgium and the Netherlands angrily insisted on being invited. 
The emergence of a genuine ménage à trois was delayed by
both the strong hostility of medium-sized and small EU countries
and bitter European divisions over the Iraq war. The personal
antipathy between French President Jacques Chirac and Blair
also played a role, as did Chirac’s quite unrealistic ﬂirtation with a
wartime French-German-Russian alliance. 
Previously, a narrow leadership core had been regarded as
superﬂuous. It was expected that the new European constitution
would introduce voting procedures that would give more weight
to the relative size of member state populations. France and
Germany relaxed in the expectation that this would tilt the
balance of power decisively in their favour. Despite enlargement,
the Franco-German leadership alliance would be preserved.
OVERCOMING EMOTION
Still, even last September, when emotions were running high
over how to stabilise Iraq in the aftermath of the war and mutual
distrust between France and Germany on the one hand and
Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland on the other still dominated the
agenda, progress was being made towards a European
triumvirate and enhanced cooperation. 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Chirac and Blair
managed to overcome their political difﬁculties and personal
animosities when they met in Berlin. They agreed to disagree
over Iraq and managed to make progress with a common outlook
on a future European defence policy. Much to the consternation
of the smaller countries, they achieved consensus on simply
ignoring the limits on national debts prescribed by the European
Growth and Stability Pact. They also insisted on including new
voting procedures within the Council of Ministers in the
proposed European constitution, thus riding roughshod over the
desires of the smaller nations. 
Shortly afterwards the Big Three’s foreign ministers went to
Tehran to put pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons
programme and allow international nuclear site inspections. Both
Italy, then in charge of the rotating EU presidency, and EU foreign
policy chief Javier Solana were left in the dark about the initiative. 
In late November, Paris, Berlin and London worked out a
blueprint for a future European security and defence policy. They
decided to downsize the proposed European military
headquarters, which had been a bone of severe transatlantic
contention, to a much smaller planning unit attached to the
military staff in the Council of Ministers secretariat. 
KIDNAPPING EUROPE
By late last year it looked as if an informal directorate of
Europe’s big three had more or less been established. British
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw conﬁrmed in mid-January that with
regard to the ‘tangible signs’ of cooperation, ‘for Britain to form a
partnership with the Franco-German motor’ of the EU ‘would be
logical once Europe moves from 15 to 25 members.’ 
A month later, Schröder, Chirac and Blair met again in Berlin.
This time they brought along four or ﬁve cabinet ministers each,
including foreign ministers, and the afternoon sessions were
convened much more formally. The three leaders insisted that
their mini summit was ‘to the advantage of all of Europe’, and
Blair emphasised that there was no ‘need to be apologetic in any
way, shape or form about’ the trilateral meeting. 
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Much to the displeasure of Europe’s smaller countries, trilateral meetings of the European Union’s 
‘Big Three’ – Britain, France and Germany – occur with increasing frequency. In fact, an informal triple
leadership has emerged. The collapse of the European constitution project at the November Rome
summit and the imminent admission of ten new members has focused minds in Paris and Berlin.
Regular Franco-German meetings developed in the early years of the European Economic Community
in the 1950s, but Britain’s presence in Europe’s most exclusive club is a more recent development. 
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Yet, emotions in some of the other 22 EU countries were running
high. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi insisted that ‘Europe
doesn’t need any directorate; it’s just a big mess,’ and the outspoken
Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio proclaimed that ‘nobody
should be allowed to kidnap the general interest of Europe.’
Italy and Spain, as well as Poland, feared that the three had a
hidden agenda and would take decisions on how to steer other
members in controversial questions such as the way forward
after the failure of the Rome summit, Turkish membership, and
who would be Romano Prodi’s successor as president of the
European Commission. 
While the three were careful to avoid these issues in public,
they were all discussed. Subjects such as Europe’s – and NATO’s –
contribution to the stabilisation of Iraq, Afghanistan and the
Middle East, Iran’s nuclear policy, and progress with the
European rapid reaction force were also analysed. 
Despite protestation that the three were not creating ‘some
kind of inner leadership to stitch up everything,’ the leaders did
not hesitate to attempt giving ‘a new impetus to Europe,’ as
Schröder put it. They sent an open letter to the Irish EU presidency
outlining the need to address three major economic weaknesses. 
Chirac, Blair and Schröder asked the Commission to publish a
precise timetable for how to reduce EU bureaucracy and
regulations which were undermining international
competitiveness and economic innovation; they called for the
creation of a Commission vice-president – or a super-
Commissioner as some journalists called it – ‘to focus exclusively
on economic reform’; and they asked member states to
concentrate on economic innovation and international
competitiveness and reform their product and labour markets. 
Productivity in the Union is approximately twenty percent
lower per capita than in America, but the three made clear that
they still believed in the EU’s rather ambitious Lisbon agenda – to
elevate the Union to one of the globe’s most dynamic economic
areas by 2010. The big three wishes to set the right tone for the
Union-wide economic conference in March.
BEING HELPFUL
What is behind this realignment? If the rhetoric about giving
the EU a boost of economic and political dynamism and working
for the common good is stripped away, two main factors remain:
fear of the consequences of EU enlargement on the ability of
France and Germany to decide on the main policy directions, not
least in a common defence and foreign policy; and the insight
that relations with America need to be patched up and put on a
much more stable and enduring basis. 
Britain, it is believed, can play a helpful role in achieving both
objectives; in turn this is likely to strengthen its inﬂuence within
the Union. It is not the mystic hankering after a Europe guided by
a small cosy group of states as in the early years of the
Community, but hard-nosed realism and the clear pursuit of the
national interest which has led to the emergence of a new
ménage à trois. Instead of reuniting the continent, however,
enlargement is already leading to a new differentiation between
ﬁrst and second tier countries. 
DIFFICULT TO DOMINATE
Both Germany and France fear that enlargement to 25
members and continued decision-making under the complex
regulations of the Nice treaty will undermine their traditional
decisive role and change the balance of power. Since the
foundation of the European Communities in the late 1950s,
France and Germany have essentially been able to work out
guidelines for important policies before formal summits. They
usually managed to convince other members to follow.
After enlargement it will be much more difﬁcult for any two
countries to dominate. Chirac’s and Schröder’s dramatic failure
to ﬁnd support from most other European governments both
during the Iraq war and over the constitution were telling 
signs. A looser, larger Europe with much weaker common
institutions and an increased role for the national governments 
of medium-sized and small countries would rapidly change 
the character of the project. 
The German and French dream of guiding an ever-closer
Union towards more federalist arrangements and developing a
signiﬁcant European voice on the global stage threatens to
become a thing of the past. 
This is particularly alarming to Paris and Berlin with regard to
foreign and defence policy; the big project for the coming years.
It is the one highly complicated and expensive area that the
Union needs to develop if it is to play a major world role. 
Recent divisions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe over the war
in Iraq and Europe’s inability to ﬁnd a common policy on how to
deal with US President George Bush’s administration’s
aspirations for global dominance and designs for pre-emptive
warfare are particularly disconcerting. The failed Rome summit
saw a similar alignment of forces as that during the Iraq war.
France and Germany encountered strong opposition from
Poland, Spain and Italy. Most eastern European governments
sided with the US. 
CRUCIAL ROLE
It is here that Britain can play a crucial role. During the war
Chirac blotted his copybook with eastern Europeans over their
support for America when he proclaimed that they had ‘missed a
good chance to keep quiet.’ Schröder’s relations with Poland
were severely damaged by his row with Polish Prime Minister
Leszek Miller, who refused to sign the new European constitution
including voting procedures favouring large countries. 
Britain, however, kept quiet and maintained a fairly neutral
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position. Previously London had earned a lot of respect in
eastern Europe for refusing to be bullied by Paris and Berlin 
into changing its position on alleged Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction, sticking to the Bush administration’s
unpopular line. Britain has thus emerged as an ideal mediator
between old and new Europe. 
The same applies to Blair’s role as a conﬁdant of Bush. 
Both Chirac’s and Schröder’s relations with the American
administration have improved substantially but, despite the
German chancellor’s successful bridge-building visit in late
February, neither he nor the French president enjoy the
admiration and degree of inﬂuence that Blair commands in
Washington. 
OPEN ARMS
A European defence policy is also not feasible without the
British. When, in April 2003, in the middle of the Iraq crisis,
Belgium invited Germany, France and Luxembourg to a defence
summit to consider setting up an independent European force
and pointedly excluded London, there was disbelief and ridicule.
After all, the defence ﬁeld is the only, but increasingly crucial,
area where Britain, with its highly developed professional army
and global expertise in guerrilla warfare and weapons
development, is way ahead of its European partners. 
Grudgingly even French, and more admiringly US, forces
respect British professionalism and expertise in defence. With
the partial exception of France, such skills cannot be found in 
any other European country. If the EU intends to focus on a
common foreign and defence policy, it cannot avoid allocating a
leading role to Britain. 
Together with London’s ability to mediate with both eastern
Europe and the US, this led Berlin and Paris to welcome London
to their fairly exclusive bilateral relationship. A certain caution
remains, however. After all, Britain is still not a member of the
eurozone, has not signed the Schengen agreement on passport-
free travel within the EU and continues to insist on its national
veto on tax, defence and foreign policy. 
There are other problems, largely of perception. Despite
Blair’s more constructive policy towards Europe compared with
almost all his predecessors, traditionally lukewarm attitudes to
integration have not been forgotten. The long-standing
impression, conﬁrmed again during the Iraq war, that London
values the ‘special relationship’ with Washington more than its
European links, and may even act as America’s Trojan horse
within the EU, is a serious concern in both Paris and Berlin. 
Yet, neither a substantial European defence policy nor a
genuine rapprochement with the US appears feasible without
British involvement. And in the aftermath of the Iraq war and
perceived American unilateralism, Germany and France regard
both as a priority if a unipolar world is to be prevented.
TANGIBLE BENEFITS
Similarly, the Blair government realises that Britain’s inﬂuence
in world affairs will beneﬁt if the EU becomes a more important
international player. It has not escaped Blair’s attention that
despite his supposedly excellent relations with both Presidents
Bill Clinton and Bush, his real inﬂuence on American decision-
making remains severely limited. The hoped-for economic
beneﬁts and more elusive perceived advantages of increasing
Britain’s great power status by ﬁghting side-by-side with America
have not materialised. 
Turning the Franco-German leadership club into a 
threesome promises tangible advantages, not merely with public
opinion at home. Britain might well be able to increase
substantially its inﬂuence within the Union, which would 
greatly beneﬁt its global position. It may even eventually 
lead to the adoption of the euro. As The Economist has 
pointed out, if big three cooperation proves difﬁcult, Blair, 
unlike Chirac and Schröder, is in the fortunate position of being
able to fall back on an alternative European alliance 
with Italy, Spain and Poland, comrades-in-arms from the Iraq 
war.  However, since the Spanish elections the new government
may move closer to the German and French position on Iraq.
A hard core of leadership countries has certainly begun 
to emerge in the enlarged Union and can be expected to 
play a crucial role. However, it would be wise to adopt a 
more transparent and consultative approach to avoid the
resentment and suspicion of the other members. Unless this is
done, there is a real danger that enlarging the Union may lead 
to an irreversible split. 
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s desperate
request in the 1970s for a telephone number if he wished to call
Europe may be about to be answered. However, his successors
will have to be content with three numbers connected to the
Elysée Palace, the Chancellery and Downing Street. 
In Washington’s eyes this would be a constructive
development much to be preferred to the current diffusion 
of power within the EU. It would give the Union a more 
coherent and ﬂexible leadership, with Britain tempering any
radical ideas from Paris or Berlin. And if transatlantic 
difﬁculties arise, the US would still have the well-practised
option of dealing bilaterally with each of the big three, in
particular Britain. This might also be helpful in undermining any
too intransigent position. 
The development of Europe’s threesome is regarded as a 
win-win situation by all the big powers on both sides of the
Atlantic. However, the Union’s small and medium-sized
countries feel left out and strenuous efforts to integrate and
cooperate with them, rather than dictate policy, ought to be
made in the interest of a functioning European Union and a
ﬂourishing transatlantic relationship.
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